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A SOVIET VIEW OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
A Review Essay of
Genrikh Trofimenko's The U.S. Military Doctrine
Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986, 222 pp.
by
James John Tritten
The U.S. Military Doctrine is a book by a Soviet world-class
specialist in international relations and the United States who
is currently chief of the Foreign Policy Department at the Insti-
tute of the U.S. and Canadian Studies in Moscow. The book has
been translated into English at a time when the Soviet Union is
undergoing a major debate in the future of their military
doctrine and strategy.
The primary worth to American readers of The U.S. Military
Doctrine is to gain an insight into the position of the Soviet
civilian academic community and think tanks into this debate.
Henry Trofimenko has been studying the U.S. for over thirty
years and uses this book to set forth enduring qualities of U.S.
military doctrine. The book thus represents Professor
Trofimenko's views of the American threat and from these views we
should be able to ascertain whether or not the author inflates
that threat or joins the ranks of those who see an accommodation
with the West as being possible.
Whereas the Soviets are comfortable with the concept of
military doctrine, Professor Trofimenko recognizes that this term
has been ignored and even rejected in the U.S., Americans prefer
to use the terms grand strategy, national security strategy, or
national strategy to discuss the concepts of military doctrine.
Trofimenko defines military doctrine as a "system of views...
concerning the essence, purpose, and character of a possible
future war, preparation for it on the part of the nations and its
armed forces, as well as the ways of waging it."
Henry Trofimenko adopts the standard Soviet model by reject-
ing the Western concept that war is synonymous with armed
conflict. The Soviets always include the political, psycho-
logical, economic, scientific, technological, and geographic
aspects of war and not merely the clash between the armed forces.
In doing so, they demonstrate that they have a different
strategic culture than that of the U.S.
Some of the different aspects of American strategic culture,
according to Trofimenko, are due to the fact that the continental
U.S. has not had to be seriously defended since the American
Revolution. Despite these and other minor historical
inaccuracies and a healthy dose of rhetoric, the author attempts
to review those major forces that have helped shape the way
Americans think about national security and defense.
According to Professor Trofimenko, the attainment of
strategic military parity between the superpowers "acts as a
check on the aggressive intentions of certain Western circles.
Another restraining factor is the growing awareness and political
activity of the popular masses." He does acknowledge, however,
that the attainment of a "position of strength" allows nations to
dominate the escalation decision. According to Trofimenko,
having a "free hand in world affairs was a major U.S. strategic
goal" following the end of World War II.
Trofimenko's views on some topical issues bear special
mention. For example, he correctly points out that, since 1950
and NSC 68, the Americans have thought about, and attempted,
competitive strategies vis-a-vis the USSR. He also states that
"pure isolationism has never existed in the United States at
all," but rather that "intervention and expansion. . .has been
going on in the U.S. ruling elite for 200 years now." Such
comments support a continuation of the Soviet view that they are
engaged in a long-term struggle with capitalism and that this
struggle exists despite the temporary absence of armed conflict.
Trofimenko views one long-term American goal as being to
"'transform' the Soviet Union's internal system."
Although the author fails to account for the Soviet build-up
of nationwide active and passive defenses (thus demonstrating
their rejection of vulnerability to nuclear retaliation as a
principle of military doctrine) and rejection for such concepts
in their political-military literature, Trofimenko attempts to
argue that mutual assured destruction (MAD) defines the actual
state of the superpowers' nuclear forces today. He correctly
argues that a proper net assessment of these forces is not a mere
tallying of "the number of strategic launchers but in the actual
combat capabilities of strategic forces on both sides." Perhaps
such comments mean that he is aligning himself with those forces
within the USSR that are arguing for less emphasis, in the short
term, on defense since the Soviets obviously have capabilities
that far exceed that which is required for a MAD environment.
Trofimenko states that "MAD is anything but an ideal
situation but currently, in the absence of any other realistic
alternative to mutual deterrence. . .it is the best basis for
preserving strategic stability." Given that nations do not seek
to preserve stability once engaged in an armed conflict, that the
Soviet Union is obviously an expansionist power, and that
Trofimenko argues that the U.S. is a non-status quo power, then
why does he argue that MAD is an acceptable means to such an
obviously flawed goal? The general Soviet view of stability is
that it cannot be achieved until the Soviets have control over
all possible enemies.
One of the enduring qualities of U.S. military doctrine,
according to the author, is the constant resort to "psychological
and direct—that is, physical—use of armed force by the United
States" to achieve political goals. Trofimenko uses a historical
surrogate to argue that the aim of the United States in any war
with the Soviet Union would be the "elimination of Soviet govern-
ment in the USSR." On the other hand, Trofimenko states that the
American view of war is to regard it "as a political tool, and
hostilities as a means of securing this or that political
objective by depriving the enemy of the will to resist." Both
options should clearly be open to the United States when
attempting to terminate a war with the USSR.
The debate over "how much is enough?" is addressed by
Trofimenko by referring to the topical term "sufficiency."
Americans, according to the author, require a military machine
that is "absolutely and wholly superior to the armed forces of
other nations." This, of course, is a description of the
existing Soviet view of "sufficiency," a term that is currently
undergoing internal debate. The United States has never fielded a
military force capable of action against all possible enemies
except for time of grave national emergency such as during World
War II.
We are tantalized only briefly with his views on the current
debate over whether or not the Soviet military should redefine
its needs to the more likely threats rather than against all
enemies. Trofimenko does so by stating that "deterrence through
dissuasion, that is at preventing nuclear war" is the cornerstone
of Soviet military doctrine. Such a doctrine rejects the concept
of deterrence by threat of punishment and the mutual vulner-
ability required under MAD.
Opinions are offered by Trofimenko on whether or not damage
limiting first strikes, a frequent theme in the Soviet military
literature, is an acceptable military strategy. He speaks of
such theory as being found in American doctrine and justified by
the concept of a "just" war. In reality, first strike damage
limitation and "just" wars are Soviet concepts found frequently
in their military literature. American literature most often
discusses retaliation and punishment rather than deterrence by
the capability to deny.
Trofimenko accords nuclear weapons a political utility in
that they restrain aggression by the West. His views on U.S.
targeting with its nuclear forces includes military and not
civilian targets; i.e. targeting that supports deterrence by
denial and not punishment. He states that the Reagan adminis-
tration nuclear buildup is a continuation of normal U.S. military
polities in support of the American bias to solve international
political problems with military forces.
The author makes a number of comments on the inability of
the American public and leadership to understand great issues of
strategy and defense. For example, he says that "in any
Congress, no more than fifteen people can lay claim to any real
competence in matters concerning the world military balance and
weapons systems." "It took U.S. strategists and theorists almost
thirty years to really sort out the military, technological and
sociopolitical issues of nuclear war; it would not be
exaggeration to say that some aspects of the nuclear missile
strategy are not clear to them to this day."
Additional passages lead one to suspect that some of these
comments are perhaps more a surrogate for internal consumption
than actual findings of U.S. strategic-military culture. For
example, Trofimenko states that "American strategic thought would
have made no progress had it not been bolstered by the work of
civilian strategists from the so-called think tanks." Further-
more, he claims that "up to the end of World War II, the U.S.
military establishment produced only one outstanding theorist--
Captain (later Rear Admiral) Alfred Thayer Mahan."
Trofimenko praises American strategic concepts of containing
Imperial Russia by preventing expansion on the flanks and at sea.
On the other hand, he dismisses former Secretary of Defense
Weinberger's concepts of "geographic escalation. . .as ravings of
an irrational mind." Interestingly, Trofimenko acknowledges that
a nation "would be able to resort to this war-widening strategy
only if it attains superiority in strategic nuclear armaments."
Almost as an afterthought, Professor Trofimenko adds to the
end of the book a discussion of navies and the "Blue water"
strategy. The author presents his view of the American naval
threat to the Soviet Union. We can contrast them with similar
themes found in Soviet naval literature and with the declaratory
U.S. Maritime Strategy. In all of these, the major naval threat
to the USSR is that to Soviet ballistic missile submarines.
What is important to note, however, is what is not said by
Trofimenko in his book. For example, he does not warn that con-
ventional attacks against nuclear assets at sea will
automatically result in vertical escalation to nuclear warfare.
When this reviewer met with Trofimenko on a panel earlier this
year, he did not support such views when they were made by other
participants.
Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergei Gorshkov's
book The Sea Power of the State is cited as evidence that the
Soviet Navy's deterrent role has been significant. One can
certainly argue with this position but the fact that the
politically astute Trofimenko cited Gorskov gives us a clue to
the late admiral's status following his 1985 retirement.
The bottom line recommendation for this book is that it is a
must for all serious students of the Soviet Union or American
defense issues. The book has been translated by the Soviets into
numerous languages, with each edition specially tailored to the
target region. It thus serves functions in the Soviet propaganda
campaign but also to gain an insight into the Soviet mind and the
internal debate whose outcome we all await. In the interests of
peace and understanding, it would be helpful if the USSR could
provide us with similar materials on the Soviet views of their
own military doctrine and strategy.
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